منابع

الف) منابع فارسی

·         سخنرانی مقام معظم رهبری(1397)، سایت دفتر حفظ و نشر آثار حضرت آیه الله خامنه­ای : http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=40264

·         نوربخش، س. ؛ غفوری،  س. ، ملکی، ع. (۱۳۹۴)، ‌به کارگیری نظریه بازی ها در تحلیل منازعه ج. ا. ایران و آمریکا با محوریت برنامه هسته‌ای ایران، مجله راهبرد، سال بیست و چهارم بهار 1394 شماره 74 ،صص: 89-132.

·         نهاوندیان، م. ؛ لطفی، م.(۱۳۹۲)، نظریه بازی­ها و تحریم اقتصادی ایران (ارائه­ی مدل مفهومی)  مطالعات دفاعی استراتژیک، تابستان 1392 - شماره 5، صص:39-68.

• مجموعه گزارش­های شورای امنیت برای تحریم­های ایران: https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm
• گلدانی، مهدی (۱۳۹۷)، الگویی برای تبیین بهینه رفتار اقتصادی کشورها در تقابل­ها نامتقارن قدرت با استفاده از نظریه بازی‌ها و نظریه چشم­انداز، دومین همایش ملی اقتصاد دفاع دانشگاه عالی دفاع ملی، زمستان 97.

ب) منابع انگلیسی

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